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Maureen E. Brady*

Abstract
Although one of the key questions in a federal system is how authority
should be allocated between the state and national governments, property
law has rarely generated serious controversy on this front. Instead, property
entitlements and the rules governing resource use have typically been the
province of state and local actors. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that property rights are created at the state level. And while federal
regulations—for example, environmental regulations—certainly limit property rights, state and local land-use laws and state nuisance and trespass
rules serve as major constraints on property’s use and enjoyment. This feature of property law means there is potential for interstate variation in property rules.
In the private law of property—the body of law that governs disputes
and relationships among private parties—there remains some variation
among the states in both the forms of property recognized and in the different rules that limit ownership and use. However, in this Essay prepared for
a symposium on federalism at the Pepperdine School of Law, I marshal evidence that one portion of the public law of property is on a different trajectory.
This Essay identifies two areas of convergence across states in constitutional takings law. First, though the federal Constitution could theoretically
protect varied property interests and could measure the constitutionality of
regulations affecting property against different background state legal re* Associate Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. Thanks to Jack Brady,
Debbie Hellman, Kate Klonick, Cynthia Nicoletti, and Rich Schragger for helpful comments on earlier drafts; to Tomi Olutoye and Alexander Snowdon for expert research assistance; and to Derek
Muller and the Pepperdine Law Review editors, especially Kat Ellena, Cameron Fraser, Ashley
Gebicke, Jake McIntosh, and Colten Stanberry, for hosting this Symposium and for their editorial
assistance.
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gimes, developments in takings doctrine have enabled some courts to make
cross-state comparisons both to create or cap the interests protected and to
determine which limitations on title an owner should have expected. Second,
despite the potential for variation offered by state constitutional takings provisions, state courts often interpret their constitutional protections for property in similar ways even when presented with different text or other relevant
considerations. This Essay identifies how lower courts are applying takings
doctrine in ways that may curb the significance of interstate differences in
property rules and speculates on the features of takings law that minimize
variation in the scope of constitutional takings protection where the potential exists for it. In surfacing the phenomenon of convergence, this Essay
builds a foundation for considering the virtues, vices, and normative desirability of uniformity and variation in both takings law and in property law
more generally.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Although one of the key questions in a federal system is how authority
should be allocated between the state and national governments,1 property
law has rarely generated serious controversy on this front. Instead, property
entitlements and the rules governing resource use have typically been the
province of state and local actors.2 The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that property rights are created at the state level.3 And while federal regulations—for example, environmental regulations—certainly limit
property rights, state and local land-use laws and state nuisance and trespass
rules serve as major constraints on property’s use and enjoyment.4
This feature of property law means there is significant potential for interstate variation in property rules. Scholars have suggested that the fact that
property law is left to the states allows for doctrinal and regulatory innovations and permits residents to agitate at a more local level for rules reflecting
their preferences.5 There is some truth to these assertions. It does not seem
coincidental that the state of California offers artists and celebrities stronger
1. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 665 (1990) (noting
that the federal system divides “responsibilities among national, state, and local governments”).
2. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Federalism, 115 YALE L.J. 72,
74 n.1 (2005) (noting that states are the traditional source of property law, while federal property law
is generally “limited to the regulation of properties owned by the United States and intellectual property law . . . .”); Stewart E. Sterk, Federal Land Use Regulation as Market Restoration, B.U. L. REV.
(forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3238139 (discussing issues related to federal limitations on local land-use regulations). There are periodically calls for limiting
state or local authority over property, particularly in the field of land use regulation, where the potential for spillovers is particularly high. See generally Sterk, supra (manuscript at 4–6); Ashira Pelman
Ostrow, Land Law Federalism, 61 EMORY L.J. 1397, 1406–07 (2012) (describing two different federal attempts “to coordinate land-use planning on a national scale”).
3. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 482 (2005); Drye v. United States, 528
U.S. 49, 58 (1999); Preseault v. I.C.C., 494 U.S. 1, 20 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984).
4. Cf. Robert C. Ellickson, Panel I: Liberty, Property, and Environmental Ethics, 21 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 397, 397 (1994) (bemoaning as “Beltway Syndrome” the way legal scholars focus on federal
land controls at the expense of local controls).
5. E.g., Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 2, at 99–100; Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of
Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 954 (2000); Ilya Somin, Federalism and Property
Rights, 2011 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 53, 54 (2011). For criticism of the notion that competitive decentralization will necessarily lead to more preference satisfaction, innovation, or economic growth, see
RICHARD C. SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER: URBAN GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL AGE 46–56 (2016);
Richard C. Schragger, Decentralization and Development, 96 VA. L. REV. 1837, 1860 (2010); Richard Schragger, Consuming Government, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1824, 1831–34 (2003).
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property (or property-like) rights in their likenesses and works than other
states do.6 Some states are well-known for their strong environmental regulations limiting property use, while other states are far more “lax.”7
To be sure, in the private law of property—the body of law that governs
disputes and relationships among private parties8—there remains some
meaningful variation among the states in both particular forms of property
recognized and in the different rules that limit ownership and use.9 However, in this Essay, I marshal evidence that one portion of the public law of
property is on a different trajectory.10 Property conflicts between private citizens and the state are often channeled through the takings clauses, the constitutional provisions that set limitations on the government’s ability to acquire or regulate private property.11 This Essay describes how state-specific
property law has become less salient when courts are resolving owner disputes against governments, as opposed to other private parties. It speculates
on the features of takings law that cause convergence in the protections af-

6. See Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 VAND. L. REV.
1597, 1608 (2008); see generally Paul Cirino, Note, Advertisers, Celebrities, and Publicity Rights in
New York and California, 39 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 763 (1994).
7. See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 583 (2001) (stating that “many states are implementing innovative [environmental] protective measures” while other “states may prefer more lax environmental regulation.”). These economists “have generally found no strong association between environmental
compliance costs and business location.” Mary Graham, Environmental Protection & the States:
“Race to the Bottom” or “Race to the Bottom Line”?, BROOKINGS (Dec. 1, 1998),
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/environmental-protection-the-states-race-to-the-bottom-or-raceto-the-bottom-line/. In other words, different environmental restrictions on property uses in different
states may reflect the preferences of residents and local interest groups rather than attempts to lure
either environmentally friendly or unfriendly firms. See id.
8. Private Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1390 (10th ed. 2014).
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part III. In using the term public law here, I mean only to separate contexts in
which the state is a party to the conflict involving the property owner from contexts in which disputants are solely private parties. See Public Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1425 (10th ed. 2014)
(defining “public law” as “[t]he body of law dealing with the relations between private individuals
and the government”). Of course, even when the government is involved in property disputes, private law plays a role. Cf. Richard A. Epstein, The Common Law Foundations of the Takings Clause:
The Disconnect between Public and Private Law, 30 TOURO L. REV. 265, 265–66 (2014) (arguing
that classification of takings law as “public law,” unmoored from private common law, has led to
doctrinal confusion).
11. The federal and most state constitutions have “takings clauses.” U.S. CONST. amend. V; e.g.,
ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 17; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19; MD. CONST. art. III, § 40; MASS. CONST. pt. I,
art. X; MICH. CONST. art. 10, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 20; N.Y. CONST.
art. I, § 7, cl. a; PA. CONST. art. I, § 10.
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forded to property, minimizing interstate variation in the scope of constitutional protection where the potential exists for it.
This Essay proceeds as follows. In Part II, I describe the persistence of
property variation in private law,12 and in Part III, two aspects of convergence in constitutional takings law.13 First, though the federal Constitution
could theoretically protect varied property interests and could measure the
constitutionality of regulations affecting property against different background state legal regimes, developments in takings doctrine have enabled
courts to make cross-state comparisons both to define the interests protected
and to determine which limitations on title an owner should have expected.
This means that courts are using a sort of national common law of property
to determine the fate of claims for compensation.14 Second, despite the potential for variation offered by state constitutional takings provisions, state
courts often interpret their constitutional protections for property in similar
ways even in the face of different text or other relevant considerations.15
The aim of this Essay is largely descriptive: to identify how lower courts are
applying takings doctrine in ways that may limit the significance of interstate differences in property rules. In discussing these phenomena of convergence, this Essay builds a firmer foundation for considering the virtues,
vices, and normative desirability of uniformity and variation in both takings
law and in property law more generally.
II. PROPERTY VARIATION IN PRIVATE LAW
All first-year law students in a Property course quickly learn that there
can be a bewildering number of state-law variations on core property interests and doctrines. Historically, there have been variations in the sorts of interests recognized as property in different states. Take conservation easements, which benefit easement holders by preventing landowners from
developing or altering property in some way.16 Massachusetts recognized
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part III.
14. See infra Section III.A.
15. See infra Section III.B; see also Gerald S. Dickinson, Federalism, Convergence, and Divergence in Constitutional Property, 73 U. MIAMI L. REV. 139, 155–82 (2018) (exploring this form of
convergence, state courts interpreting their constitutions in lockstep with the federal constitution).
16. See Jessica Owley Lippmann, The Emergence of Exacted Conservation Easements, 84 NEB.
L. REV. 1043, 1044 n.1 (2006) (defining “conservation easements” as a “voluntary private land protection scheme[]”).
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them a full fifty years before Wyoming passed a statute creating them.17
Similarly, other forms of easements have emerged unevenly in different
states, including easements or rights of access entitling owners to prevent
nearby modifications to their means of entry and egress,18 or easements of
view preventing neighbors from blocking the visibility of owners’ businesses from the street.19 Variation is not limited to easements like these,20 and
new variations continue to arise from time to time.21
On top of the fact that states sometimes recognize different property interests, state legislatures and courts have imposed different doctrinal limitations on those property interests. A few highlights may illustrate the point.
Consider adverse possession, which famously entitles the possessor of property to obtain title over the true owner with the passage of time; in some
states, good faith is required for a valid adverse possession claim against an
owner;22 in other states, the adverse possessor’s state of mind is irrelevant;23
and for a time, at least in a few states, only a bad-faith adverse possessor
could obtain title.24 State property laws also differentially limit who can
17. See id. at 1085–86. Prior to passing the statute, some Wyoming residents were using more
traditional property tools like covenants and equitable servitudes for conservation purposes. Id. at
1085 n.205.
18. Maureen E. Brady, Property’s Ceiling: State Courts and the Expansion of Takings Clause
Property, 102 VA. L. REV. 1167, 1184–89 (2016).
19. Note, Abutting Landowner’s Easement of View, 5 N.Y. L. REV. 43, 43–46 (1927).
20. For a few other examples outside the servitude context, see Bell & Parchomovsky, supra
note 2, at 74–75; Maureen E. Brady, Penn Central Squared: What the Many Factors of Murr v. Wisconsin Mean for Property Federalism, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 53, 60–61 (2017).
21. For example, in the last few years, New York has floated creating a property-like right to
control one’s likeness that actors could transfer to heirs to prevent their appearance on-screen as
computer-generated characters after their deaths. Jennifer E. Rothman, New York Once Again Floats
Right of Publicity Law, ROTHMAN’S ROADMAP TO THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY (June 7, 2017, 12:45
PM),
https://www.rightofpublicityroadmap.com/news-commentary/new-york-once-again-floatsright-publicity-law. Anyone whose likeness is used in New York could enforce this right, not just
New York residents, so it would not have the same effect of creating uneven property entitlements
afforded to residents of different states, but it is nonetheless an example of state innovation. See id.
22. See, e.g., Croell Redi-Mix, Inc. v. Baltes, No. 08–0379, 2009 WL 778760, at *3 (Iowa Ct.
App. Mar. 26, 2009) (stating that a valid adverse possession cause of action requires a good faith
claim of right).
23. See, e.g., French v. Pearce, 8 Conn. 439, 443 (1831) (explaining that “it is the visible and
adverse possession, with an intention to possess, that constitutes its adverse character, and not the
remote views or belief of the possessor”).
24. See Preble v. Maine Cent. R.R. Co., 27 A. 149, 150 (Me. 1893), overruled by Dombkowski
v. Ferland, 893 A.2d 599, 605–06 (Me. 2006) (abandoning the “Maine rule” approach to adverse
possession by statute); see also Mannillo v. Gorski, 255 A.2d 258, 262 (N.J. 1969) (describing the
Maine rule and the New Jersey court’s decision to disavow its previous adherence to that rule).
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possess property interests. The grantor of a parcel can reserve an easement
in favor of a third party in some states but not in others.25 Laws governing
access to natural resources also change depending on the state in which they
are located;26 Oregon recognizes customary rights entitling the public to access beaches,27 while New Hampshire expressly rejects those rights.28 And
the tort of nuisance may partly owe its reputation as a “legal garbage can” to
the plethora of nuisance rules that proliferate across state borders.29 Right to
farm laws immunize agricultural operations from nuisance liability to different extents in different states,30 and the tests for determining whether an activity is a nuisance differ as well.31 The amount of variation in property law
even decades ago led one law professor to criticize the American Law Institute’s effort to write a Restatement of Property as “impossible from its inception. There is no ‘American law of property,’ and there can be none so
long as the present federal system of government persists.”32
Why is there variation in state property law? As explained at the outset,
courts and scholars often repeat the maxim that property is a creature of state
law,33 and whenever authority over a body of law is reserved to the states, it

25. Compare Estate of Thomson v. Wade, 509 N.E.2d 309, 310 (N.Y. 1987) (holding that a third
party is a “stranger to the deed” and cannot be the beneficiary of an easement by reservation), and
Pitman v. Sweeney, 661 P.2d 153, 154 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983) (using the same rule), with Willard v.
First Church of Christ, Scientist, Pacifica, 498 P.2d 987, 991 (Cal. 1972) (in bank) (joining Kentucky and Oregon in abandoning the “stranger to the deed” rule).
26. See Maureen E. Brady, Defining "Navigability": Balancing State-Court Flexibility and Private Rights in Waterways, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1415, 1420, 1424–27 (2015) (cataloging different
common law definitions of “navigable” for the purposes of defining “the scope of the public trust”).
27. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 2, at 95 n.124.
28. See Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 114
YALE L.J. 203, 223 (2004) (noting these different rules in Oregon and New Hampshire).
29. See Ronald G. Aronovsky, Federalism and CERCLA: Rethinking the Role of Federal Law in
Private Cleanup Cost Disputes, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 71 (2006) (“[N]uisance law . . . varies dramatically from state to state.”); William L. Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 TEX. L. REV. 399, 410
(1942) (coining the term “legal garbage can”).
30. Alexander A. Reinert, Note, The Right to Farm: Hog-Tied and Nuisance-Bound, 73 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1694, 1695 (1998).
31. EMILY DOSKOW & LINA GUILLEN, NEIGHBOR LAW: FENCES, TREES, BOUNDARIES & NOISE
230–33 (9th ed. 2017).
32. William R. Vance, The Restatement of the Law of Property, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 178
(1937).
33. See, e.g., D. Benjamin Barros, Note, Defining "Property" in the Just Compensation Clause,
63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1853, 1879–81 (1995); Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 2, at 74 n.1; James
Y. Stern, Property’s Constitution, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 277, 286 (2013).
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creates the potential for differences.34 But some have argued that states have
special institutional expertise over the property within their borders.35 In the
heyday of “federal common law,” when federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction considered themselves free to ignore state common law rulings,
federal tribunals nonetheless deferred to the state common law of property as
a quintessentially “local” issue.36 Federal courts today routinely list family
law and property law as areas where they should abstain or defer to allow
“expert” state courts to resolve ambiguities in the doctrine.37 Furthermore,
jurists and scholars often suggest that state actors need flexibility to tailor
property rules to particularities within their jurisdictions.38 Any court decision that threatens to have the collateral effect of freezing the state’s common law of property is criticized as preventing judges and legislators from
adapting their state’s property law to future local circumstances.39
Of course, no one suggests that variation is an unmitigated good. First,
more rules or interests does not necessarily mean better rules or interests.40
Indeed, property doctrines seem to spawn a handful of variations rather than
fifty different approaches.41 In some instances, a rule arising in one jurisdic34. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing how the
states are laboratories of federalism as each state has the authority to define their own laws in novel
ways).
35. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 482 (2005) (emphasizing that the federal
government owed “great respect” to “state legislatures and state courts in discerning local public
needs”); Somin, supra note 5, at 54 (noting that arguments for federalism in the property context
invoke “superior knowledge and expertise of state and local governments in catering to the diverse
needs of their communities”).
36. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 18 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938); see W. David Sarratt, Note, Judicial Takings and the Course Pursued, 90 VA. L. REV. 1487,
1528 (2004). But see Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79
TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1413–14 (2001) (noting that federal courts still sometimes meddled in property
law in the era of Swift v. Tyson).
37. See, e.g., Kelo, 545 U.S. at 482; San Remo Hotel v. City and Cty. of San Francisco, 545 U.S.
323, 347 (2005); LoCurto v. LoCurto, No. 07 Civ. 8238 (NRB), 2008 WL 4410091, at *8 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 25, 2008); W. Hartford Initiative to Save Historic Prop. v. Town of West Hartford, No. 3:06–
CV–739 (RNC), 2006 WL 2401441, at *7 (D. Conn. Aug. 18, 2006); In re Sweet, No. 6:12–bk–
03271–KSJ, 2012 WL 5555004, at *2 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Nov. 15, 2012); In re Carter, 156 B.R. 768,
771 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1993); In re Desmarais, 33 B.R. 27, 29 (Bankr. D. Me. 1983).
38. See Frank I. Michelman, Property as a Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1097,
1104 (1981).
39. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1068–69 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Timothy M. Mulvaney, The New Judicial Takings Construct, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 247, 262
(2011); see also Brady, supra note 26, at 1450 (describing this as the “ossification problem”).
40. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 38, at 1104.
41. See Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Exclusivity and Speech: The Legacy of PruneYard v. Rob-

703

[Vol. 46: 695, 2019]

Property Convergence in Takings Law
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

tion may have such desirable consequences that it should be adopted everywhere; other times, different rules more effectively address different conditions, expectations, or preferences in different places. Second, Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith have rightly pointed out that a sort of “numerus
clausus” principle operates to limit variation in property: property rights tend
to be structured in a limited number of standardized forms to reduce the information costs to all third parties needing to ascertain who holds which
rights.42 This principle has undoubtedly reduced variation, certainly as a
matter of judicial lawmaking, although legislatures have still been responsible for significant innovations in property rights in different states.43 Finally, to recognize the existence of variation is not to say that all innovations or
variations are good.44 States have long created property interests that are
economically inefficient or morally abhorrent45—though one can argue that
these interests should be relegated to the fringe or eliminated without arguing against variation itself.46
On the whole, however, variation has rarely been criticized, except perhaps by the fiercest advocates of uniformity (or perhaps by first-year law
students approaching final exams and frantically memorizing various state
rules).47 To the contrary, scholars and judges have often suggested that
states have expertise on property, and innovation and experimentation are
viewed as systemic benefits.48 In lieu of proposals for standardization, “it is
a commonplace of Our Federalism that [rules of property] are left for definition by bodies of state law that the States are free to shape as they severally

ins, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 41 (1997) (“[T]he level of agreement across states is far greater than is
sometimes supposed, in part because of the unifying forces created by the Restatements and the
standard treatises on the subject.”).
42. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 3, 9–12 (2000). For example, there are a finite number and fairly uniform types of freehold and leasehold interests in each state. See id. at 11.
43. Id. at 9–12, 58–60.
44. See Michelman, supra note 38, at 1104.
45. See, e.g., id.
46. Cf. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (the beauty of federalism is that if one state tries an inefficient or morally abhorrent “experiment,” the other states are
free to reject it).
47. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Why Restate the Bundle? The Disintegration of
the Restatement of Property, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 681, 692–93 (2014) (noting that the Restatement of
Property project veered toward advocating for reform in ways consonant with a move toward “uniform” legislation).
48. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 2, at 78–79; Merrill, supra note 5, at 954.
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choose.”49
III. PROPERTY CONVERGENCE IN TAKINGS LAW
Despite the persistence of some variations in property doctrines as a
matter of private law, a different phenomenon occurs in one of property’s
public law applications: takings. In general terms, the takings clauses of the
state and federal constitutions prevent private property from being taken for
public use without just compensation.50 This is the area of property law that
most empowers property owners against both direct confiscation and confiscatory regulation—“regulatory takings”—by federal, state, and local governments. The Supreme Court has enabled interstate variation in the application of the federal Takings Clause by emphasizing the role of
nonconstitutional state property law in defining both what counts as constitutional property and in measuring whether a taking has occurred.51 As a result, the differences among states in both the specific property interests protected and in regulatory and doctrinal limitations on those interests could
lead to differences in the operation of the Takings Clause in different states.
Similarly, as a matter of state takings law, differences in state constitutional
text and history could lead to different levels of protection against confiscation.52 Nevertheless, takings law is often marked by convergence, rather
than variation.

49. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A Comment on Lucas and
Judicial Conservatism, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 310 (1993); see also Merrill, supra note 5, at
954 (noting that because the Constitution “does not require that constitutional property be created in
any particular form,” it “permits substantial experimentation and evolution of property institutions
over time”).
50. U.S. CONST. amend. V; e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 17; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19; MD. CONST.
art. III, § 40; MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. X; MICH. CONST. art. 10, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13; N.J.
CONST. art. I, § 20; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. a; PA. CONST. art. I, § 10.
51. The Supreme Court has not defined the constitutional terms “property” and “taken” in a way
that would limit interstate variation—for example, by defining “property” as “land.” Instead, the
definitions incorporate positive state law. See Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 164
(1998); Sterk, supra note 28, at 222–24.
52. See JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 16–19 (2018) (noting how different provisions and other local considerations
might change states’ approaches to constitutional interpretation).
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A. Federal Takings Law and Defining Reasonableness
Though the same federal Takings Clause applies to the actions of the
federal government, and state and local governments,53 the Clause need not
apply identically across state borders. First, because property interests can
vary by state,54 a type of interest recognized in one place may not exist, let
alone be protected, by the Constitution in another.55 Second, in the regulatory takings context, the Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the role of
background state property law in analyzing whether a taking has occurred.56
Several of the Court’s tests examine whether a regulation “takes” by examining how the owner’s title or expectations were limited by pre-existing circumstances, including background law.57 Differences in background state
law could make a regulation a taking in one jurisdiction, but not in another,
because identically situated owners would be operating under different
background constraints.58 To borrow an example developed by Stewart
Sterk, Oregon has long recognized customary rights for the public to use
dry-sand beach areas, whereas New Hampshire has specifically rejected
those rights.59 If the same regulation were passed in both states forbidding
owners from building structures in the dry-sand portion of the beach, the
New Hampshire owner would seem to have a stronger claim that his or her
property rights were interfered with than a similarly situated Oregon owner,
because the Oregon owner even before the regulation could not have imped53. See Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233–34 (1897); Michael Graf,
Application of Takings Law to the Regulation of Unpatented Mining Claims, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 57,
75 n.92 (1997).
54. See Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 164 (1998) (“Because the Constitution
protects rather than creates property interests, the existence of a property interest is determined by
reference to ‘existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state
law.’” (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972))); Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984) (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colls., 408 U.S. at 577);
Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980) (quoting Bd. of Regents of
State Colls., 408 U.S. at 577); Brady, supra note 20, at 59–63.
55. See Merrill, supra note 5, at 952–54 (noting that although “property” is a federal constitutional term, state actors can create interests that meet that bar in any form, allowing “experimentation and evolution of property institutions over time.”).
56. See Sterk, supra note 28, at 206 (stating that protection against unconstitutional takings heavily depends on background state law principles).
57. See id. at 226.
58. Id. at 233.
59. Id. at 223.
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ed the public’s customary rights by building structures in that location.60
Although these tests leave open the prospect of some variation among
states, courts have adopted interpretations of the federal Takings Clause that
facilitate convergence. There are signs that courts are using interstate comparisons to affect the scope of takings protection for property in two ways:
first, by using interstate comparisons to create the background state law
against which an owner’s expectations are judged, and second, by using interstate comparisons to create or limit the unit or type of property recognized
as constitutionally salient for federal purposes.
A potential cause of this phenomenon is the use of “reasonableness” and
similar terms in Takings Clause cases.61 This is not unique to takings;
throughout constitutional law, “reasonableness” has moved from its common
law roots into all sorts of constitutional settings.62 An inherent problem with
reasonableness is this: what counts as reasonable may vary depending on the
chosen comparators.63 If asking whether a person’s conduct is reasonable,
considerations relating to age, professional background, knowledge, and
other experiences may change the calculus.64 If asking whether a government’s law or policy is reasonable, one may get different answers if comparing the action against a jurisdiction’s own history and laws versus examining
broader trends across states.65 Reasonableness raises these problems in the
takings context. As this Section identifies, the unclear parameters of reasonableness have permitted courts to measure property and takings by reference
to the rules and interests protected in other states, which has altered the potential that otherwise exists for interstate variation.
The history of reasonableness relating to the takings law phrase “in60. See id.
61. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979) (discussing whether a taking has
occurred based on a factors test, including “its interference with reasonable investment backed expectations”).
62. Brandon L. Garrett, Constitutional Reasonableness, 102 MINN. L. REV. 61, 61 (2017) (“The
concept of reasonableness pervades constitutional doctrine.”).
63. Id. at 61–62 (“[T]he underlying concept of reasonableness that courts adopt varies, with
judges using competing objective, subjective, utility-based, or custom-based standards. . . . The use
of the common term reasonableness to such different ends can blur distinctions between rights and
remedies.”).
64. See id. at 72–73.
65. See generally Brandon L. Garrett, Local Evidence in Constitutional Interpretation, 103
CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 6-8), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abs
tract_id=3133213 (discussing the Supreme Court’s reliance on state law when interpreting the Constitution in order to help form a general consensus).
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vestment-backed expectations” is illustrative. This phrase comes from Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, which set forth three factors
for courts to examine in determining whether a regulation is a taking: “the
character of the governmental action,” “[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant,” and “the extent to which the regulation has interfered
with distinct investment-backed expectations.”66 The notion of investmentbacked expectations originated in Frank Michelman’s 1967 article “Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of ‘Just
Compensation’ Law.”67 In analyzing the Supreme Court’s few takings cases
prior to that date, Michelman observed that it would oversimplify the
Court’s takings analysis to focus primarily on the magnitude of the diminution in value suffered by the property owner.68 Instead, Michelman asserted
that, as a descriptive matter, the takings test primarily examined “whether or
not the measure in question can easily be seen to have practically deprived
the claimant of some distinctly perceived, sharply crystallized, investmentbacked expectation.”69 To give meaning to this language, Michelman asserted that courts would be more likely to find a taking had occurred when a
regulation banned an established use as opposed to one not yet undertaken;
courts would be unlikely to find a taking when a landowner had not “yet
formed any specific plans for his vacant land.”70
Eighteen months after the Penn Central opinion invoked “distinct investment-backed expectations,” the language changed almost imperceptibly
in Kaiser Aetna v. United States.71 In a garden-variety physical takings case
involving the conversion of a private pond to a public aquatic park, Justice
Rehnquist briefly canvassed all of takings law, including the recently decided Penn Central case, noting that it had declared “interference with reasonable investment backed expectations” to be an important analytical factor in

66. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
67. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations
of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1213 (1967). For the observation that
Michelman is the source of this factor, see Steven J. Eagle, The Regulatory Takings Notice Rule, 24
U. HAW. L. REV. 533, 557 (2002); Lynda J. Oswald, Cornering the Quark: Investment-Backed Expectations and Economically Viable Uses in Takings Analysis, 70 WASH. L. REV. 91, 100–01 (1995).
68. Michelman, supra note 67, at 1233.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1233–34.
71. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). Penn Central was decided on June 26, 1978. Id. at 104. Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, the case that slightly changed the test, was decided on December 4, 1979.
444 U.S. 164, 164, 175 (1979).
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the regulatory takings context.72 This shift from “distinct” expectations to
“reasonable” expectations was almost certainly not intended to change the
analysis.73 But some have suggested that distinctness and reasonableness
carry different meanings, even if the Supreme Court and some lower courts
use the terms interchangeably.74 To determine the “distinctness” of an owner’s expectations, Michelman suggested courts would likely focus on the
property owner’s plans and expenditures of capital in light of what the prior
legal framework permitted.75 To determine reasonableness, on the other
hand, courts have used a much wider range of considerations to assess the
property owner’s behavior.76
The difference between distinctness and reasonableness may not be as
significant as that view would suggest.77 For instance, just as “reasonableness” implies limitations on constitutionally cognizable expectations about
72. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 165–66, 175 (emphasis added).
73. J. David Breemer, Playing the Expectations Game: When Are Investment-Backed Land Use
Expectations (Un)Reasonable in State Courts?, 38 URB. LAW. 81, 85–86 (2006) (referring to this
change as “seem[ingly] inadvertent”); Calvert G. Chipchase, From Grand Central to the Sierras:
What Do We Do with Investment-Backed Expectations in Partial Regulatory Takings?, 23 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 43, 56–66 (2004) (noting that “[t]he change was made without comment and seemingly
without purpose”); Eagle, supra note 67, at 560–61 (“[I]t is not clear that Kaiser Aetna in fact intended to mandate governmental review of the plausibility of owners’ views.”). In addition, the authorship of the Kaiser Aetna opinion lends further support to the idea that a change in meaning was
not intended, or at least not one that would harm property owners; Justice Rehnquist was “a strong
proponent of robust Fifth Amendment private property protections.” Chipchase, supra, at 59; see
Eagle, supra note 67, at 560–61.
74. See, e.g., Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 787 P.2d 907, 915 n.29 (Wash. 1990); Chipchase, supra note 73, at 60 n.104 (collecting Supreme Court cases in which “reasonable” and “distinct” are used interchangeably in takings clause issues).
75. See Michelman, supra note 67, at 1233–34.
76. Michael M. Berger, Happy Birthday, Constitution: The Supreme Court Establishes New
Ground Rules for Land-Use Planning, 20 URB. LAW. 735, 765–67 (1988); see Breemer, supra note
73, at 85–86 (“[W]hatever its purpose in Kaiser Aetna, the use of the term ‘reasonable’ invited examination of the validity of a claimant’s expectations rather than examination of the effect of regulation in precluding distinctly planned, profitable uses of land.” (emphasis omitted)); Chipchase, supra
note 73, at 57 (“The term ‘distinct’ thus directs a claimant to produce evidence showing that she intended to develop her property in the manner alleged and that she expended capital in furtherance of
those plans. In contrast, the term ‘reasonable,’ or ‘reasonably prudent,’ implies that courts are to
determine whether the claimant’s demonstrated expectations were appropriate or justified given the
circumstances of the case.” (footnotes omitted)); Eagle, supra note 67, at 560 (“After all, ‘expectations’ are individualistic and possibly idiosyncratic views of the world. ‘Reasonableness,’ on the
other hand, implies both the individual judgment and the societal determination that the judgment is
at least plausible.”).
77. See Chipchase, supra note 73, at 60 n.104 (showing how different cases have used the words
“reasonable” and “distinct” interchangeably or not at all).
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property,78 there are surely limits on the “distinct” expectations that might
form the basis for a takings claim.79 Compensation is a means of redressing
a loss: the ability to control the “destinies” of one’s things and the psychological and economic harm resulting from that deprivation of control.80 But
control is always finite. Both distinct and reasonable investment-backed expectations have boundaries affected by preexisting state-specific regulations
and common-law limitations.81 And preexisting law may not furnish the only limitation: as Carol Rose observed, takings law has long been a “muddle”
because it requires mediating between owners’ expectations and the civic
duties all members of a community share to not harm one another or the
public at large.82 While there have been critics of the ad hoc reasoning involved in assessing owner expectations and evaluating whether compensa78. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005–07 (1984) (noting that “[a] ‘reasonable investment-backed expectation’ must be more than a ‘unilateral expectation or an abstract
need,’” for despite Monsanto’s unilateral interest in the secrecy of its data, existing EPA regulations
concerning confidentiality put limits on Monsanto’s property interest (quoting Webb’s Fabulous
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980))); Forest Props., Inc. v. United States, 39
Fed. Cl. 56, 76 (Fed. Cl. 1997) (“A regulatory scheme affecting the property at issue at the time of
purchase can significantly discount an owner’s investment-backed expectations with respect to the
property. In fact, numerous courts have found that a regulatory structure can thoroughly abrogate a
property owner’s investment-backed expectations.”); City of Dallas v. VRC LLC, 260 S.W.3d 60,
66 (Tex. App. 2008) (“We consider existing law regulating the use of property in determining
whether the regulation interferes with investment-backed expectations . . . .”).
79. See Chipchase, supra note 73, at 65–66 (discussing limits on distinct expectations).
80. Cf. Michelman, supra note 67, at 1234 (noting that the need for compensation depends on the
assumptions that individuals control the destinies of their “things” and that deprivation of that control is injurious in some way to the individual).
81. See id. at 1029-30 (noting that where “background principles of the State’s law of property
and nuisance” place limits on land ownership, no taking has occurred); Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 728 (2010) (plurality opinion) (suggesting that
court decisions may trigger Takings Clause if “what had been private property under established law
no longer is.”); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1034–35 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting “the whole of our legal tradition,” beyond simply common law,
should be used to determine the reasonableness of an owner’s expectations). Thus, members of the
Court have often conceptualized existing legal limits on uses of property as a natural termination
point for takings protection. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029–30 (majority opinion); Id. at 1034–35 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 560 U.S. at 728. There are, of course, very
close cases under either term, such as one identified by Michelman, where an individual purchases
property in the midst of a public debate about some specific future restraint on its use. Michelman,
supra note 67, at 1238.
82. See Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S.
CAL. L. REV. 561, 594–97 (1984); see also Joseph William Singer, The Ownership Society and Takings of Property: Castles, Investments, and Just Obligations, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 309, 336
(2006) (“The question of justice and fairness does not relieve us of the burden of judgment, and
that—perhaps more than any other reason—explains why it is the right question.”).
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tion is required,83 some balancing of the owner’s subjective intentions
against external limitations is probably inevitable in fairly accommodating
the competing interests of the owner and society with respect to how property is held and used.84
The operative question, then, is what considerations and comparisons
should be involved in a holistic analysis of “distinctness” or “reasonableness.” Courts have approached this question in different ways,85 but some
have begun treating other states’ laws as considerations affecting the legitimacy or plausibility of an owner’s investment-backed expectations.86 In
Wisconsin, for example, the state court of appeals treated the fact that

83. See Stephen Durden, Unprincipled Principles: The Takings Clause Exemplar, 3 ALA. C.R. &
C.L. L. REV. 25, 27–28 (2013).
84. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005) (“[T]he Takings Clause is
meant ‘to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.’” (quoting Armstrong v. United States,
364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). There are some circumstances where
per se rules derive from this fairness principle—for example, the uncontroversial takings case where
land is condemned for a highway. Richard Kahn, Inverse Condemnation and the Highway Cases:
Compensation for Abutting Landowners, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 563, 564 (1995) (“[V]irtually
all courts would allow compensation if even the tiniest fraction of private property was condemned
for a right of way for highway construction.”). In most cases about inverse condemnations through
regulation, however, courts approach the fairness question by ad hoc balancing. Lucas, 505 U.S. at
1015 (“[W]e have generally eschewed any set formula for determining how far is too far, preferring
to ‘engag[e] in . . . essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.’” (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of
New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Brady, supra note 26,
at 1456–59 (advocating a balancing approach in the judicial takings context so that “courts will still
have a fair degree of power to modify their law within reasonable parameters, but the Takings
Clause will prevent the most egregious eliminations of property rights”).
85. See Berger, supra note 76, at 765–67; Robert M. Washburn, “Reasonable Investment-Backed
Expectations” as a Factor in Defining Property Interest, 49 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 63,
63, 69–71 (1996). Preliminary research suggests there may be other factors besides those listed in
these articles, and in several cases, courts suggested that it is unreasonable for owners to develop
expectations if state actors have not affirmatively permitted or promised them the ability to do what
they are now restrained from doing. See State Dep’t of Nat. Res. v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp., 834
P.2d 134, 140 (Alaska 1991); Columbia Venture, LLC v. Richland County, 776 S.E.2d 900, 914
(S.C. 2015). Other times, courts imply that if a property type or use is often regulated, future interferences with that property interest are more foreseeable and thus unlikely to give rise to claims for
compensation. Me. Educ. Ass’n Benefits Tr. v. Cioppa, 695 F.3d 145, 154 (1st Cir. 2012); Golden
Pac. Bancorp v. United States, 15 F.3d 1066, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Brace v. United States, 72 Fed.
Cl. 337, 354–55 (Fed. Cl. 2006); Turntable Fishery & Moorage Corp. v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl.
256, 261 (Fed. Cl. 2002); Brakke v. Iowa Dep’t of Nat. Res., 897 N.W.2d 522, 550 (Iowa 2017);
Canal Ins. Co. v. Hopkins, 238 S.W.3d 549, 570 (Tex. App. 2007).
86 See Hawkeye Commodity Promotions, Inc. v. Vilsack, 486 F.3d 430, 442 (8th Cir. 2007); Int’l
Ass’n of Machinists Dist. 10 & Its Local Lodge 1061 v. State, 903 N.W.2d 141, 151 (Wis. Ct. App.
2017).
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“twenty-five other states” had enacted right-to-work laws as constraining unions’ expectations with respect to the property in their union treasuries.87
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held in another decision that a property
owner’s experience with a video-poker ban in South Carolina should have
led them to expect that their property—video-poker machines—might become regulated into valuelessness in Iowa.88 Though other courts have reiterated the importance of using state-specific law in takings inquiries,89 these
examples illustrate that the unclear parameters of “reasonableness” in the
Penn Central analysis90 can permit different state regulations to limit property owners’ expectations regardless of jurisdictional boundaries. Property
owners’ constitutional rights can be limited by a sort of multijurisdictional or
national property law—an amalgam of state common law and statutory restrictions elevated to constitutional significance.91
Reasonableness has recently found its way into a second portion of the
takings analysis: the definition of “property” and the so-called “denominator
problem,” which refers to difficulties in ascertaining the relevant property
interest on which a regulation operates.92 The problem arises whenever liti87. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists Dist. 10, 903 N.W.2d at 151.
88. Hawkeye Commodity Promotions, Inc., 486 F.3d at 442.
89. See Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1538-39 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (plurality opinion)
(criticizing the government’s attempt to “use . . . federal law as well as state law in selecting the relevant ‘background principles’” for determining restrictions on owner’s expectations); id. at 1556,
1561 & n.6 (Clevenger, J., dissenting) (analyzing Vermont law closely to ascertain the scope of an
easement property interest).
90. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 137–38 (1978).
91. Cf. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 500, 506 (1987) (suggesting that claims based on the “unique support estate” recognized in Pennsylvania are “legalistic”).
The Keystone Court rejected the plaintiff’s claim that a coal regulation constituted a taking, even
though the challenged regulation was quite similar to the regulation held to be a taking in the earlier
case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). In deciding Pennsylvania Coal,
the Court found it significant that Pennsylvania recognized a “support estate” separately transferable
from either the surface land or the coal rights, essentially allowing surface and mineral rights to trade
the right to cause or be free from subsidence. 260 U.S. at 415. Yet the Keystone Court seemed to
minimize the importance of this unusual Pennsylvania property interest: “Petitioners therefore argue
that even if comparable legislation in another State would not constitute a taking, the Subsidence Act
has that consequence because it entirely destroys the value of their unique support estate. It is clear,
however, that our takings jurisprudence forecloses reliance on such legalistic distinctions within a
bundle of property rights.” 480 U.S. at 500. Despite this language that could be read to minimize
the importance of state-specific law, the Court still claimed to rely on “Pennsylvania law” in reaching its takings-related conclusions. Id.
92. See Brady, supra note 20, at 53–54; Danaya C. Wright, A New Time for Denominators: Toward A Dynamic Theory of Property in the Regulatory Takings Relevant Parcel Analysis, 34 ENVTL.
L. 175, 190–93 (2004).
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gants dispute the proper unit for conducting the takings analysis: one parcel
or multiple parcels possessed by the same owner, or a particular legal estate
or property right versus a combination of them.93 A regulation may drastically reduce the value of a small unit of property but work only a partial
diminution of use and value on a larger unit.94 In other words, deciding on a
denominator may affect the subsequent resolution of a takings case.95
The Supreme Court’s most recent discussion of the denominator problem occurred in 2017, in Murr v. Wisconsin.96 The case concerned a regulation that rendered a family unable to sell or develop one of their two small
waterfront lots; when the lots came under common ownership, they were
“merged” and could no longer be separately sold or built upon.97 The question was whether the lower court should use the single undeveloped waterfront parcel as the unit for evaluating the family’s takings claim or whether
the court should use two neighboring parcels owned by the family, which
would make the diminution in value far smaller.98 In instructing courts how
to resolve the denominator inquiry, the Court laid out three factors: (1) the
treatment of the property under state law, including lot lines and reasonable
restrictions affecting use and disposition of the property;99 (2) the physical
characteristics of the property, including its topography, the surrounding environment, and whether it is in an area “likely to become subject to, environmental or other regulation[;]”100 and (3) any value effects of the regulation, such as whether the burden on one portion increases the value on
another portion or the two portions taken together, suggesting multiple units
are in a “special relationship” and should be considered a single unit.101
Overall, “[t]he endeavor should determine whether reasonable expectations
about property ownership would lead a landowner to anticipate that his hold93. See Wright, supra note 92, at 190 (explaining that in the regulatory takings context, “the
problem lies in identifying the bundle from which a particular property right has been taken”).
94. Id. at 191 (explaining that if a landowner has ten acres that are fully developable except for
one acre of undevelopable wetlands, then the landowner’s loss from the regulatory taking depends
on whether that one acre or the whole ten acres serve as the denominator).
95. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1054 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(“[W]hether the owner has been deprived of all economic value of his property will depend on how
‘property’ is defined.”).
96. 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1938 (2017).
97. Id. at 1941.
98. Id. at 1941-42.
99. Id. at 1945.
100. Id. at 1945-46.
101. Id. at 1946.
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ings would be treated as one parcel, or, instead, as separate tracts.”102
Several parts of this denominator test invite convergence.103 The Murr
majority opinion uses the word “reasonable” twenty-one times—and that
does not include permutations like “reasonably” and “unreasonable.”104
While, again, reasonableness or a balancing approach may be appropriate in
the denominator inquiry,105 the term reasonableness is open-ended enough to
raise questions about the proper comparators without further specification.106
Both reasonableness and likeliness are invoked in the Murr test in facially
broad ways: courts are to consider the role of “reasonable restriction[s]” on
the owner’s land and whether the property is “likely to become subject to[]
environmental or other regulation.”107 If experience with “reasonable investment-backed expectations” is any guide, courts may use the laws of other states to decide what it is reasonable for property owners to expect or
what was likely to limit the property owner’s uses of land.108 Indeed, in the
Murr opinion itself, the Court suggested that the provision rendering one of
the Murrs’ lots undevelopable was a reasonable restriction on their ownership because merger provisions had been around for “nearly a century,”109 as
compared to the Wisconsin law that merged their parcels, which was eighteen years old.110 The basis for this claim about the well-settled history of
102. Id. at 1945.
103. See Brady, supra note 20, at 66 (“Murr represents a new and different threat to property federalism than these previous rulings. . . . [because it] permits courts applying federal takings law to
incorporate the property law of other jurisdictions to determine the scope of the interests protected.”).
104. See Murr, 137 S. Ct at 1939-50.
105. See Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States, 707 F.3d 1286, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (stating that
the court takes a holistic, “flexible approach” to the denominator question, which is “designed to
account for factual nuances” (quoting Loveladies Harbor, Inc., v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1181
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Brady, supra note 20, at 70 (noting
that “[t]he Murr majority was not necessarily wrong to adopt a nuanced, flexible approach to the
denominator problem” and that “courts need flexibility”).
106. See Brady, supra note 20, at 70 (stating the Murr factors are “perplexing and untried,” making the test “impossibly vague, unpredictable, and confused”).
107. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1945-46 (emphases added).
108. See Brady, supra note 20, at 67–68 (discussing how a new regulation on a property owner in
one jurisdiction may be deemed reasonable by a court because that regulation already exists in another jurisdiction).
109. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1947.
110. See id. at 1940–41 (stating that the Wisconsin law was enacted in 1976 and the property was
conveyed to the Murrs in 1994 and 1995). This is not to suggest that eighteen years is an inadequate
duration; instead, it points out that the Court invoked a longer duration from a different place ostensibly because it would make the property owners look even less reasonable. Id. at 1947.
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merger provisions was the fact that Great Neck Estates, New York, passed a
merger provision in 1926111—some 1,185 miles and numerous decades away
from the site.112 Though it is too early to tell whether lower courts will engage in similar cross-state comparisons to determine what an owner should
have anticipated about property units,113 the centrality of reasonableness and
likeliness in the new Murr test at least makes convergence more plausible.114
Murr raises the prospect that other states’ property laws could be used to
contract the scope of protection for property owners.115 However, courts
have often used laws from other states in the opposite way: to expand or
guarantee protection to owners when a state denies the existence of a
right.116 A long line of Supreme Court precedent indicates that states may
not roll back recognition of property to “sidestep the Takings Clause by disavowing traditional property interests long recognized under state law.”117
Just as there are ambiguities in what factors determine “reasonableness,”
there is a latent ambiguity in this quotation: does the term “traditional” afford constitutional protection only to interests previously recognized within
a particular state, interests reaching some federally recognized bar for what
property is, or interests traditionally recognized in most states but denied in
the site where the alleged taking has occurred? Some court decisions have
suggested it may be the last of these options.118 In one takings case, a Ninth
111. Brief of Amici Curiae Nat’l Ass’n of Ctys. et al. in Support of Respondents at 9, Murr v.
Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017) (No. 15-214), 2016 WL 3383223, at *9.
112. Driving Directions from Great Neck, N.Y, to St. Croix Cty., Wis., GOOGLE MAPS,
http://maps.google.com (follow “Get Directions” hyperlink; then search “A” for “Great Neck, New
York” and search for “B” for “St. Croix County, Wisconsin”; then follow “Get Directions” hyperlink).
113. See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 1101–02 (9th ed. 2017) (noting divergence in early scholarly reactions to the Murr decision).
114. See Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1945–46 (discussing a number of factors that involve reasonableness
and likeliness).
115. See Brady, supra note 20, at 56 (“Murr invites courts and litigants to define protected constitutional property by reference to the law and regulation of other states, undermining the security of
interests that would otherwise appear stable under a single jurisdiction’s rules.”).
116. Id. at 59–60.
117. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 167 (1998); see also Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 439 (1982) (stating that “the government does not have unlimited power to redefine property rights”).
118. But see Vandevere v. Lloyd, 644 F.3d 957, 966–67 (9th Cir. 2011) (using only Alaska law in
deciding whether fishing entry permits were property); Quinn v. Syracuse Model Neighborhood
Corp., 613 F.2d 438, 448 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting that “the state may not magically declare an interest
to be ‘Non property’ after the fact for Fourteenth Amendment purposes if, for example, a longstanding pattern of practice has established an individual’s entitlement to a particular governmental bene-
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Circuit panel recognized as property the interest accrued on principal belonging to prisoners, notwithstanding a state statute designating that interest
as publicly owned, on the basis that the “interest follows principal” rule enjoys “near-universal endorsement by American courts—including California’s.”119 More recently, that same circuit found that Washington teachers
have a protected property right in daily interest (denied to them by a state
policy change) despite the state’s position that there was no law conferring
such a property right, noting the “common law pedigree” of the “rule that
interest accrues” daily and citing cases from Georgia, Maryland, New York,
and Pennsylvania to support their finding that property had indeed been affected.120
The use of multistate law here gives rise to the puzzle: the Takings
Clause would be a nullity if constitutional protection only attached to what a
state affirmatively recognizes as property because a state could simply get
around the compensation requirement by claiming no property exists.121 If a
state tries to extinguish a property right through that loophole, how should
courts decide whether to recognize one? Scholars have generally endorsed
the idea of the federal bar: state-specific law creates the relationships and
rights that either rise or fail to become protected property as a matter of federal constitutional law.122 But some courts are evidently using the law of
multiple states to define where that federal bar should be located.123 This
example neatly indicates some of the difficult questions associated with
convergence. Perhaps multijurisdictional law should be used to compose the
lower limit: a set of property rights that no state can eliminate without triggering the compensation requirement.124 Takings protection would be ineffective without some baseline. But if multijurisdictional law sets a floor,
should it be used to construct a ceiling?125 The upper limit of constitutional
fit,” but evaluating only New York law to determine existence of that interest).
119. Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1201 (9th Cir. 1998).
120. Fowler v. Guerin, 899 F.3d 1112, 1118 (9th Cir. 2018).
121. See Stern, supra note 33, at 288 n.31.
122. See Brady, supra note 20, at 59–60; Merrill, supra note 5, at 927; Stern, supra note 33, at
287.
123. See Brady, supra note 20, at 60.
124. Id. at 59-60 (noting that the “Court has been skeptical about declining constitutional protection to an interest when some positive state law declares it is not property, even though other positive
state law seems to treat it as such”).
125. See DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 64–67 (2002). Along
with David Dana, Thomas Merrill suggested in several writings that there must be a ceiling to avoid
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property protection in takings law has generally received less attention than
the floor,126 and the phenomenon of convergence directly raises the question
of whether multijurisdictional law should furnish some upper boundary on
the sorts of interests that will be protected.127
It is worth noting here that the effects of convergence on property owners do not necessarily cut in a single direction. When it comes to defining
what counts as constitutional property, convergence might help property
owners in a state that is declining to recognize an interest by inviting courts
to fashion one in the absence of specific state law.128 Conversely, convergence might hurt owners in states that have unusual forms of property or
outlier rules affecting the appropriate unit for the takings analysis because it
might be unreasonable to rely on those fragile interests in light of the rules in
other jurisdictions.129 Likewise, when it comes to examining the reasonableness of an owner’s expectations, courts could limit takings protection by
counting a range of regulations from different states as constraints rendering
an owner’s expectations implausible or else enhance takings protection by
discounting an unusual preexisting regulation due to the absence of that rule
in other states.130 Whether courts use other states’ laws as swords or shields
for property owners, when property interests or background laws are set by
some sort of majority rule, it threatens to blunt one of the supposed benefits
of allocating authority over property rules to the states.131 One of the virtues

the “too much property” problem which would result from states expanding the coverage of property
to make more actions takings in undesirable and manipulative ways. See id.; Merrill supra note 5, at
935 (proposing a federal constitutional definition of Takings Clause property that does not derive
from the rules of multiple states).
126. See Brady, supra note 18, at 1227 (noting paucity of work on whether doctrinal or other constraints “reduce the costs of constitutional property innovation by courts in takings law”).
127. See Brady, supra note 20, at 65 (explaining that there is some precedent that suggests federal
constitutional property law acts as a ceiling).
128. See id. (explaining that Supreme Court takings cases could be read “to establish that federal
constitutional property is a floor: the Constitution will recognize as property certain interests, even
when the state would try to wriggle out from them through invoking dubious positive law”).
129. See id. at 68–69 (“[I]f a state is an outlier in recognizing a new form of property, . . . any
good government lawyer litigating a regulatory takings claim [can] marshal evidence from across
time and space to make a new regulation seem reasonable and to make owner expectations look unreasonable.”).
130. See id. at 67.
131. See id. at 69 (“The benefits of constitutional property federalism—the democracy-enhancing,
welfare-enhancing, and efficiency-enhancing effects of competition and innovation among the
states—are blunted by the threat that the Constitution will protect only a uniform set of interests with
the weight of multistate law and regulation behind them.”).
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of property federalism is supposed to be experimentation and innovation, but
convergence raises the prospect that new interests or innovative regulations
might be squelched as “unreasonable” or given limited effect because of the
very fact that they are outliers.132
In short, the Court has often suggested that the relevant background law
for defining constitutionally protected property interests and for measuring
whether a regulation interferes with owner expectations is jurisdictionspecific.133 But various features of federal takings law discussed in this Section allow the laws of one state or the likelihood of regulation to shape protections for property interests in others. The structure of federal takings law
leaves open the possibility for variation: different property interests might be
recognized in different states, and different regulatory and common law regimes might make an identical regulation a taking in one state but not in another. However, the Supreme Court has developed tests that permit the validity of property interests to be determined by cross-state comparisons and
that measure an owner’s expectations by reference to the law of multiple jurisdictions. This ultimately points toward convergence: the property interests protected and the sorts of actions that will constitute takings may be
similar across state boundaries if the background law used in the analysis is
multijurisdictional or national, rather than limited to a single state.
B. Converging State Constitutional Standards
Another opportunity for variation in takings law occurs at a different
site: state constitutional law. Nearly all the state constitutions offer protections against uncompensated takings that parallel the federal Constitution.134
Some of these provisions are textually different from the federal Takings
Clause,135 meaning different levels of takings protection are possible under
the state constitution versus the federal Constitution.136 Moreover, different
132. See id.; Sterk, supra note 28, at 205 (defending the lack of uniformity in state law takings
rules).
133. See Brady, supra note 20, at 67 (“Years of court opinions have encouraged property owners
to form expectations based on the law of the jurisdiction in which the property is located.”).
134. See Maureen E. Brady, The Damagings Clauses, 104 VA. L. REV. 341, 349, & n.30 (2018)
(“Every state except North Carolina and Kansas has at least one state constitutional provision prohibiting property from being ‘taken’ without compensation.”).
135. See generally id. at 355–60 (describing the history of constitutional provisions that say “taken or damaged” or “injured”).
136. Id. at 344 & n.6 (“More than half of the state constitutions contain a takings clause that is
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histories, constitutional debates, and attitudes within a state might lead state
tribunals to arrive at different interpretations even of similar constitutional
takings language.137
Again, however, state takings law has tended to converge on federal interpretations of the Takings Clause. Nearly all state courts have opted to
borrow federal takings tests like the Penn Central test wholesale, rather than
developing alternative approaches to evaluating the constitutionality of regulations under their own constitutions.138 Only a small handful of states gesture at different or novel takings tests.139
materially different from the federal one, in that it prohibits property from being both ‘taken’ and
‘damaged’ or ‘injured’ for public use without just compensation.”).
137. See People v. Caballes, 851 N.E.2d 26, 43 (Ill. 2006) (citing “textual language (whether there
is any significant difference between the phrasing of the state and federal provisions), the legislative
history of the state constitutional provision, preexisting state law, state traditions, and public attitudes” as reasons why interpretations of state constitutions might diverge from interpretations of the
federal Constitution).
138. Phillips v. Montgomery County, 442 S.W.3d 233, 240–42 & n.10 (Tenn. 2014) (citing a substantial number of state courts that have borrowed the federal takings test). See Animas Valley Sand
& Gravel, Inc. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 38 P.3d 59, 64 (Colo. 2001) (en banc); Haw. Hous. Auth. v.
Lyman, 704 P.2d 888, 896 (Haw. 1985); Hampton v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater
Chicago, 57 N.E.3d 1229, 1240 (Ill. 2016); State v. Kimco of Evansville, Inc., 902 N.E.2d 206, 210
(Ind. 2009); Harms v. City of Sibley, 702 N.W.2d 91, 97 (Iowa 2005); Buhmann v. State, 201 P.3d
70, 85 (Mont. 2008) (“[A] takings analysis based on federal law under Penn Central or Lucas is to
be applied to takings claims whether brought under the U.S. or Montana Constitutions.”); Mansoldo
v. State, 898 A.2d 1018, 1023 (N.J. 2006); Wild Rice River Estates v. City of Fargo, 705 N.W.2d
850, 856 (N.D. 2005); Cereghino v. State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n, 370 P.2d 694, 697 (Or.
1962); United Artists’ Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 635 A.2d 612, 616 (Pa. 1993);
Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 548 N.W.2d 528, 531–32 (Wis. 1996); Josephine L. Ennis, Comment,
Making Room: Why Inclusionary Zoning Is Permissible under Washington’s Tax Preemption Statute
and Takings Framework, 88 WASH. L. REV. 591, 617 (2013) (noting that Washington courts have
oscillated between reading its constitution more broadly and in lockstep with the federal Constitution); see also Fields v. Sarasota Manatee Airport Auth., 953 F.2d 1299, 1308 (11th Cir. 1992);
McCarran Int’l Airport v. Sisolak, 137 P.3d 1110, 1131 (Nev. 2006) (Becker, J., dissenting in part
and concurring in part); Charles E. Cohen, Takings Analysis of Police Destruction of Innocent Owners’ Property in the Course of Law Enforcement: The View from Five State Supreme Courts, 34
MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 1, 22 (2002) (noting the use of federal precedents in takings law in California, Texas, Minnesota, Oklahoma, and Iowa).
139. See DeCook v. Rochester Int’l Airport Joint Zoning Bd., 796 N.W.2d 299, 305–06 (Minn.
2011) (noting court’s history of sometimes relying on federal constitutional tests and other times
relying on test developed solely for evaluating takings under state constitution); Coast Range Conifers, L.L.C. v. State ex rel. Or. State Bd. of Forestry, 117 P.3d 990, 997 (Or. 2005) (en banc) (noting
Oregon rule that taking occurs only where the “regulation leaves the owner with [no] economically
viable use of the property”); Utah Dep’t of Transp. v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 275 P.3d 208, 215
(Utah 2011) (describing the test as “any substantial interference with private property which destroys
or materially lessens its value, or by which the owner’s right to its use and enjoyment is in any substantial degree abridged or destroyed” (quoting Stockdale v. Rio Grande W. Ry. Co., 77 P. 849, 852
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The adoption of federal tests may make sense when the constitutional
text is identical,140 but it is harder to explain convergence when there are major textual differences between the state and federal takings clauses.141 In a
context I have explored in previous work—when the state takings clauses
provide compensation not just for property “taken,” but also for property
“damaged” or “injured”—state courts have borrowed from one another in
interpreting their constitutional provisions, meaning a single test for whether
a “damaging” has occurred is the dominant approach in most states.142 This
is the case even when there are different enactment histories and other textual variations.143 Furthermore, state courts have found that the addition of
this “or damaged” language adds little to federal protections in all but the
most extreme outlying cases.144 In short, in lieu of fifty (or even just two or
three) different approaches to state takings law, federal precedents are very
likely to be controlling as a matter of state constitutional interpretation.
There are exceptions. Following the backlash to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Kelo v. City of New London, in which the taking of Suzette Kelo’s house for a proposed private development was upheld as a valid “public
(Utah 1904))); Manufactured Hous. Cmtys. of Wash. v. State, 13 P.3d 183, 187–88 (Wash. 2000)
(en banc) (describing a mix of state and federal tests). It is somewhat unclear whether these tests
result in material differences in state and federal protection. See, e.g., Ennis, supra note 138, at 617
(noting that after the Manufactured Housing case in Washington, at least one court continued to follow federal precedents).
140. See, e.g., Buhmann, 201 P.3d at 85 (stating that Montana courts take guidance from federal
case law when applying a takings claim, “a practice that is consistent with that of other states with
similar or identical language in their state constitutions”).
141. See, e.g., DeCook, 796 N.W.2d at 305 (stating that while the takings language of the Minnesota Constitution is broader than the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause language, Minnesota courts
often still apply the federal standard).
142. See Brady, supra note 134, at 382–88 (noting that the approach of the Illinois courts to interpreting the words “or damaged” was used in nearly every state with a takings clause involving the
words “damaged” or “injured”). James Krier and Stewart Sterk have observed that state takings doctrine is least harmonious (and the Supreme Court is least frequently cited) in cases involving flooding and government enterprises, cases for which the damagings clauses are ideally suited and for
which there is no pertinent Supreme Court precedent. James E. Krier & Stewart E. Sterk, Am Empirical Study of Implicit Takings, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 35, 73–74 (2016).
143. Brady, supra note 134, at 388 (“[A] multitude of state supreme courts interpreting damagings
clauses from Virginia to California noted that the United States Supreme Court had ‘approved’ or
‘concurred in’ the Illinois holding.”).
144. Id. at 388 (noting that interpretations of “or damaged” language in takings clauses rendered
language “nearly inapplicable to anything except the sorts of physical invasions that would ordinarily qualify as a taking”). But see Dickinson, supra note 15, at 164 n.145 (listing cases where state
courts have pointed out the “or damaged” textual difference, although my own research suggests this
is more rhetorical than substantive).
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use” within the meaning of the Takings Clause,145 many state courts and
constitutional drafters responded by interpreting or amending their constitutions to make clear that economic development was not a valid “public use”
under the state constitution for the exercise of the eminent domain power.146
Other state courts declined to expand protections for property owners, following the Supreme Court in interpreting the “public use” or “public purpose” provisions of their own constitutions broadly.147 This has led to some
variation in property protection across jurisdictions.148 For this reason, some
have hailed the post-Kelo response by state actors as a triumph of interstate
variation: residents can agitate politically for the property protections they
desire.149 Others have argued that these state responses suffer from a variety
of infirmities and loopholes that render the responses less successful than
they appear, demanding a national response.150 Tellingly, many of these infirmities are convergent: most post-Kelo statutes or constitutional amendments permit takings when the property is blighted, as that term is broadly
and similarly defined.151 Nevertheless, the post-Kelo movement is an unusual example of some variation across states and between the state and federal doctrine in one aspect of takings law, even if the long-term effectiveness
of that movement is not yet clear or certain.152
In addition to post-Kelo laws yielding variation in property protection,
some states have statutes that endeavor to strengthen protection against confiscation above and beyond what the federal Constitution requires.153 Arizona, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oregon, and Texas have statutes on the
books resulting either from voter initiatives or legislation that could be read
145. 545 U.S. 469, 475, 489-90 (2005).
146. See, e.g., Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1141 (Ohio 2006); Board of Cty. Comm’rs
of Muskogee Cty. v. Lowery, 136 P.3d 639, 650–51 (Okla. 2006); ILYA SOMIN, THE GRASPING
HAND: KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON AND THE LIMITS OF EMINENT DOMAIN 135–64, 182–83 (2015)
(cataloging legislative and judicial changes).
147. See, e.g., Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 170–71 (N.Y. 2009).
148. See Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN.
L. REV. 2100, 2114, 2115–16 tabls.3 & 4 (2009); see also Dickinson, supra note 15, at 182–97, 212–
19 (describing different post-Kelo innovations and offering explanations for these examples of divergence despite convergence elsewhere in constitutional takings law).
149. See Robert C. Ellickson, Federalism and Kelo: A Question for Richard Epstein, 44 TULSA L.
REV. 751, 762–63 (2009).
150. SOMIN, supra note 146, at 136, 141–64, 173–78; Somin, supra note 5, at 87–88.
151. SOMIN, supra note 146, at 145–53.
152. See Somin, supra note 148, at 2114.
153. See Krier & Sterk, supra note 142, at 78.
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to require compensation for a greater range of government interferences with
property than federal doctrine does.154 But as an empirical matter, except for
Oregon, these statutes have had extremely limited effect.155 Courts have
construed the statutes narrowly, the statutes have generated no significant
doctrinal innovations, and litigants do not often win additional protection.156
The prospect of greater degrees of protection in some states rather than others by virtue of different legislative protection against confiscation may be a
matter of appearance rather than reality.157
To put it simply, apart from different interpretations of the “public use”
limitation and modest statutory innovations, states often decline to break
new doctrinal ground as a matter of state takings law or to develop different
ways of analyzing whether a taking has occurred.158 Instead, interpretations
of the state takings clauses tend to follow federal law in lockstep.159 In the
last Section, I suggested convergence within federal takings law may be attributable to the unclear parameters of reasonableness, likelihood, and foreseeability in federal takings tests. The root causes of lockstep interpretation
in state constitutional law are much harder to determine: judges might be
persuaded by federal opinions or simply mistaken about the force of federal
precedents.160 Lockstep interpretation is not at all unique to the takings
clauses, and state court judges rarely explain why they are adopting federal

154. Id. at 78–79.
155. Id. at 78; see also Dickinson, supra note 15, at 176–82 (finding that “conformity with [federal] regulatory takings doctrine is the norm” even when it comes to state legislation). Oregon stands
in contrast: after the enactment of voter-approved initiatives that required compensation whenever
the market value of property was simply reduced, rather than reduced past some threshold, over
6850 claims for “government payment or waiver” were filed within three years. Krier & Sterk, supra note 142, at 80.
156. Krier & Sterk, supra note 142, at 78–80.
157. See also Somin, supra note 148, at 2105 (stating that twenty-two of the thirty-six state legislatures that have enacted reform laws in response to Kelo are mostly symbolic because they provide
“little or no protection for property owners”).
158. See, e.g., Ennis, supra note 138, at 617 (demonstrating Washington courts’ willingness to
apply the federal standard to state takings clause determinations in spite of the distinction in language between the Washington and federal takings clauses).
159. See Phillips v. Montgomery County, 442 S.W.3d 233, 240–42 (Tenn. 2014) (providing a list
of examples of states applying federal standards for a takings claim analysis).
160. Joseph Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of State Constitutional Law, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 323,
338–39 (2011) (noting that state supreme courts may have tended to continue interpreting state constitutions in lockstep even after calls for more robust state constitutionalism “either from force of
habit, mistaken belief that they were bound by the federal rules, lack of expertise, or simply because
they agreed with [Supreme Court] reasoning”).
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precedents, principles, and tests as their own.161 Yet this discussion by the
Tennessee Supreme Court in 2014 may provide at least some clues: according to that court, having a different set of takings rules “would needlessly
complicate an already complex area of law, increase uncertainty for litigants
attempting to bring claims under both the federal and state constitutions, and
place Tennessee at odds with the vast majority of states, nearly all of which
have already adopted federal takings jurisprudence.”162 Whether these benefits of avoiding complexity outweigh the loss of potentially fruitful experimentation is an open question. Still, without passing on the normative desirability of any given modification to state takings law, the most important
observation is that state takings law coheres around the Supreme Court’s
pronouncements as those have been set out in the federal context.163
IV. CONCLUSION
Because states are given primary control over property in our federal
system,164 there is potential for corresponding variation in state law.165 Yet
this Essay has demonstrated that there are differences in how that potential
has borne out. In the private law context, states still sometimes tailor property rights to the things and people in their jurisdiction, recognizing different
types of interests and placing different sorts of limitations on property rights.
In the public-law takings context—when individual property owners are not
squabbling among themselves, but rather defending property interests
against some government—one can observe a different trajectory.
Descriptively, the sorts of property interests protected and the background legal rules used to measure whether a regulation is a taking show
signs of convergence, both as a matter of federal and of state takings law. In
the context of federal takings law, this may be due to the indeterminate factors affecting the interpretation of terms like “reasonable,” “foreseeable,”
and “likely” when they are used in federal takings tests. Because the Consti161. James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761,
792 (1992); see Dickinson, supra note 15, at 198–211 (arguing that simplicity, avoidance, textual
similarity, and other factors all likely contribute to convergence in takings law).
162. Phillips, 442 S.W.3d at 244.
163. Id. at 240–42 (listing “an overwhelming majority of states whose constitutions or statutes
contain provisions similar to the Takings Clause . . . [and that] have used the analytical framework
developed by the United States Supreme Court when adjudicating regulatory takings claims”).
164. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 2, at 74 n.1.
165. Id. at 99–100.
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tution protects interests created by the state, the federal Takings Clause
could protect different interests in different states. Likewise, the federal
Clause might require compensation for regulations differently because different states’ background laws and circumstances might render a single
regulation unexpected and draconian in one jurisdiction but totally expected
and predictable in another. But as a practical matter, some courts have interpreted “reasonableness” to be shaped by laws from multiple states, yielding a more uniform or national set of background principles from which protected property interests and inherent limitations on title are drawn. This
makes it more likely that federal takings law will protect similar interests
and will find similar regulations constitutionally permissible or infirm, even
in states with somewhat different underlying rules.
Likewise, state takings law is also marked by convergence. The phenomenon of lockstep interpretation, well known in other constitutional contexts, is also present in takings law. Many states adopt federal takings precedents wholesale as a matter of state constitutional interpretation. Even
when there are differences between the state and the federal constitutional
text governing confiscation and devaluation of property, states tend to interpret their constitutions both in ways similar to one another and in ways that
provide limited variations on protection.
These emerging trends in property law tee up questions about the merits
of variation directly. There may well be plausible reasons for takings law to
yield more homogenous results across state lines than, say, the law of adverse possession or some unique easement might. On the other hand, variation itself may be especially in need of protection when a state has extended
an outlier right by its own actions and tries to use another state’s rules to
prevent that right from being asserted against it. This Essay noted how variation persists in underlying state property rules in private law, whereas developments in takings law may be eroding it. The task of justifying these
different trajectories remains for another day.
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